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An Informational Model for Two-Person Games 
SILVIU GUIA~U 
Mathematical Institute, Bucharest, Romania 
In this paper the two-person game is considered as a feedback compound 
communication system. The signals of such a communication system are the 
players' actions. The existence and the effective form of random strategies sup- 
plying the largest amount of information compatible with the utilities of all 
possible variants of the game in respect to a goal are given. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The theory of games is a well-developed chapter of the current cybernetics. 
But, unfortunately, between this chapter and another one of cybernetics, i.e., 
the information theory, there is no connection whatsoever. Indeed, the 
fundamental notion of the information theory, namely the entropy, i.e., the 
measure of information or, equivalently, the measure of uncertainty, does 
not appear in the usual theory of games. At the same time, the fundamental 
notion of the theory of games, namely the utility of an event with respect o a 
goal (in the theory of games, the utility of a variant of the game has a major 
significance) does not appear in the usual information theory. In the present 
paper such a connection between these two chapters of the cybernetics is 
given. 
More precisely, we want to apply the information theory to the theory 
of games. Of course, such an attempt needs a new measure of information 
which takes account both aspects of the information, the quantitative one, 
related to the probability and the qualitative one, related to the utility. But in 
the paper, Beli ~ and Guia~u [1] such a formula of the information was 
proposed, taking into account the two basic concepts of probability and 
utility with respect o a goal of all possible events. In the following, we want 
to use this new measure of information in the theory of games. 
Using this measure of information as function of probability and utility, 
we shall hereby give an informational model of the systems with strategies 
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occuring in the theory of games. The influence of the information theory 
will consist of two parts: 
(a) First, the system with strategies appears as a feedback compound 
communication system. In this informational model, a system with strategies 
is considered as a random category, i.e., a mathematical object composed 
of sets and of random correspondences between these sets; consequently, the 
whole theory becomes more intuitive. 
(b) Second, and this is the most important fact, the existence and the 
effective form of the random strategies of the players supplying the largest 
amount of the information, as a function of probability and utility, compatible 
with the utilities of all possible variants of the game with respect o a goal, 
are given. There is an essential difference with respect o the original game 
problem. Indeed, in the classical theory of games, the existence (but not 
always the effective form) of the random strategies upplying the largest 
expectation of the utilities of all possible variants, i.e., the mean win of the 
game, are investigated. But the players are not interested in realizing only a 
large expectation of the utility. Every player wants to know what is his 
random strategy which will supply both the largest possible mean utility 
for him and the maximum uncertainty for his adversary. The occurrence of 
a variant of the game removes a double uncertainty: the quantitative one, 
related to its probability of occurrence, and the qualitative one, related to its 
utility for the fulfillment of the goal. Because, in the following, we have 
already a measure of information as a function of probability and utility 
the existence and the effective form of the random strategies of the players 
supplying the largest amount of information compatible with the utilities 
of all possible variants of the game are given. 
We consider in this paper only the two-person games, especially those 
that simplify the mathematical formalism. 
2. THE Two-PERSON GAME AS A FEEDBACK 
COMPOUND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM 
DEFINITION. 1. A two-person game is a mathematical object 
J -~ {X, Y, uk(xl, yl .... , xn, yn), (k = I, 2)} 
where X is the finite set of all possible actions of the first player; Y is the 
finite set of all possible actions of the second player; n is the number 
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of the actions executed by each player, i.e., the duration of the game; 
uz,(xl ,Y l  ,..., xn, Yn) is a positive real number and it represents the utility 
for the player k, (k = 1, 2), of the game's variant composed of the successive 
actions Xl, Yl .... , x~, yn with xi ~ X, Yi ~ Y, (i = 1, 2 ..... n). 
DEFINITION 2. We shall call a deterministic strategy of the first player 
of every system (x 1 ,..., xn) composed of n actions x i ~ X, (i = 1, 2,..., n). 
The same is true for the second player. 
DEFINITION 3. A random strategy of one player is a system of prob- 
abilities with the sum equal to 1, defined on the set of all possible deter- 
ministic strategies of the respective player. 
Thus, if we consider a probability for every possible deterministic strategy 
of one player so that the sum of all these probabilities i  equal to 1 ; we obtain 
a random strategy of the respective player. 
Now, let us suppose that we know the following probabilities: 
pl(X) ~ O, pdx  l xl , y~ ,..., X,_l , y~_a) >~ O, 
p~(y ] x l ,  Yl ..... x~-l, Y~-I, x;) ~> 0, 
with 
such that 
p~(x) = 1, ~ pi(x I xl , y l  .... , Xi-l , Yi-1) = 1, 
x~X x~X 
Pj(Y I x l ,  Yl ,..., x.~-i, YJ-1, x:.) = 1, 
y~ Y 
(1) 
i = 2, 3,..., n; j - -  1, 2,..., n; x~X,  yz~Y, ( l= l ,2  ..... n); 
where pl(x) is the probability of the first action x E X of the first player; 
p~(x I x l ,  Yl ..... xi -1,  Yi-1) is the probability of the action x ~ X of the first 
player at the moment i of the game, (a moment of the same is composed of 
one action of the first player followed of one action of the second player), 
if the successive actions at the previous moments were Xl ,..., x~_l for the 
first player and yl .... , Yi-1 for the second one; p~(y [ xl ,  Yl ,..., x~-l, YJ-1, xj) 
is the probability of the action y e Y of the second player at the moment j 
of the game, if at the previous moments the successive actions were x 1 ,..., x~- 
for the first player and yl ,..., y~._~ for the second one. 
All these considerations are valid such that x~ ~ X, y~ ~ Y, (l = 1, 2,..., n)° 
Of course, it may happen that the probabilities of the actions of the players 
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at different moments of the game do not depend on all previous successive 
actions of both players. But this is only a particular case of the more general 
one considered above. 
Now, it is necessary to make a useful notation. Namely, if we have two 
finite sets X and Y and also a probability measure p(x) defined on the set 
X, i.e., 
p(x)/>0;  Z p(x) = 1, 
~eX 
then, a probability measure p(y x) defined on the set Y conditioned by 
x~X,  i.e., 
p(y i x) >~ O; ~ p(y [ x) = 1, 
~t~ Y
such that x ~ X, represents for all x ~ X a random correspondence b tween 
X and Y: We shall denote it by 
x Y. (2) 
Xl 
I PT (Y]×I) 
xttx Y~ . p2C×I×I ,yl) • ×i x 
(xi× Yi) . . . . . . . . . . .  "7, 
I 
n-I i 
i TI_1 ( Xl ×Yi) 
X i = X ( i=1 ,2 , . . . ,n )  
Yi =Y 
Pn (xl ×V Yl ..... Xn -I' Yn-I ) n - I 
a,-- I~I (Xi×Yi)xXn 
pn(y] x! 'Yt ..... ,xn-I 'Yn-1 'Xn ) 
n 
i~1( xi xYi) 
Fie. l. The diagram of the two-person game's time-development. 
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Of course, this conditioned probability measure p(y lx )  for all x a X 
determines a probability measure p(y) on the set Y, defined by the equality 
p(y) = ~ p(x,y), (y a r) ,  
x~X 
where 
p(x, y) = p( y I x) p(x), 
such that x E X, y ~ Y. 
If we know probabilities (1), by using notation (2), the time-developement 
scheme of the game J can be given as in Fig. 1. 
Fig. 1 represents time-developement of the feedback communication 
process of the block diagram of the system under investigation (Fig. 2). 
[~ 2 nd Ployer t.~ × 
FIO. 2. The block diagram of the system under investigation. 
Let us prove the following lemma: 
LEMMA 1. Let J be a two-person game according to the definition 1. Then, 
the system of probabilities (1) determines completely the probabilities of all 
possible variants of the game. Namely, the probability of the variant Xl , Yl ,..., xn , 
y ,  of the game J has the value 
p(,o(xl , y l  ,..., x,~ , y,,) = pl(xl) [-[ p,(x, ] xx , y l  ,..., x,_~ , Y,-1) 
/=2 
× f i  Pj(Yj l x~, Yl,. . . ,  xj-1, YJ-1, x~). 
j= l  
(3) 
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Proof. The first arrow of the diagram of Fig. 1 defines the probability 
measure 
P(1)(xl , Yl) = pl(Xl) Pl(Yl [ xl). 
The second arrow of the same diagram defines the probability measure 
p(2)(Xl, y l ,  x2) = p~(x~ I x~, y~) p(1)(xl, Yl) 
= p~(x~) p~(x 2 I x l ,  Yl) PI(Y~ I x~), 
and from this last equality together with the third arrow of Fig. 1, we obtain 
the probability measure 
p(2)(x~ , y~ , x2 , Y2) = P2( Y~ I x~ , y~ , x2) p(2)(Xl, Yl, xz) 
= pl(Xl) P2(x~ ] Xl, Yl) Pl(S1 [ xa) P2(Y2 [ xl,  Yl, x~). 
By mathematical induction we obtain the expression (3). Q.E.D. 
COROLLARY 1. The probability of the pair (xk, Yk) composed of the action 
x~ and, respectively, Yk executed by the players at the moment k of the game J, 
conditioned by the successive pairs (xl , Yl) ..... (x~_~ , Yk-a) and executed at the 
previous moments of the game, has the value 
Pk(xk , Yk I Xl , Yl ..... Xk-1, Yk-1) 
= pk(xk [ X~, Y l , ' " ,  Xk-1, Yk-~) Pk(Y~ r Xl, Y l , ' " ,  Xlc-1, Yk-1, Xk). (4) 
Proof. The expression (4) is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1 
because we have 
P(~)(xl , Yl ,'", x~ , Yk) Q.E.D. 
Pk(xk, Yk ] Xl, Yl ,'", Xk-1, Y~-I) ----- p(/¢_l)(Xl ' Yl  ,. . . ,  xk -1 ,  Yk-1) " 
Remark 1. The probabilities 
pk(x, y I Xl , Yx ..... xk-1, Y~-I) ,  (k ---- 2, 3,..., n), 
are obtained by closing the diagram from the Fig. 1. Indeed, by closing this 
diagram we obtain the complete diagram given in the Fig. 3. 
DEFINITION 4. A two-person game J will be called a two-person game 
with independent s rategies if the random strategy of each player does not 
depend of the actions of the other one. 
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For instance, if we consider the probabilities (1), we obtain a game with 
independent strategies if 
Pi( x [ Xl , Y l  , ' " ,  X i -1 ,  YI-1) = Pi( x [ xI ,'", xi-1), 
PJ(Y ] xl , Yl ,'", xJ-1, YJ-1, x~) = p~(y ] Ya ,'", YJ-t), 
(i = 2, 3,..., n) 
(5) 
(j = 1, 2,..., n) 
such that 
xeX,  yeY ,  x~eX,  y~eY,  ( l=1 ,2  ..... n). 
Remark 2. Obviously, a two-person game J in the sense of the definition 
1, together with the probabilities (1), appears as a random category, composed 
of three sets X, F, R +, of 2n --  1 random correspondences 
i--1 
]--[ (X ,~ X Y#)  P i (X[X l 'y l  . . . . . .  i - l ,y i -1)  i -1  ' I~  (Xk  x Y~:) x X~,  ( i  = 2, 3,..., n) 
k=l  ~=l 
J--1 J 
1-[ x x xj ...... [ [  x 
k=l  /c=1 
( j  = 1, 2,. . . ,  n), 
FIG. 3. The closure of the diagram from Fig. 1, 
Xf 
I Pt (yl x 0 
p2(x Ix 1 ,yl) 
Xtxy  t ~ X| x y~ xX 2 X i =X ( i=l ,2 , . . . ,n)  
pa(ylx~,y I x a) 
Pa(X 
2 - 
r[ (X ix  Yi ) . . . . . . . . . . .  
i = ! - ' .  i 
" i 
n -'1""% ~' "Pn(Xlxl,y 1 ..... xn_t, y._l) n _ 1 
i~, (X  x Y %  - t[[=l (XixYi)xX n 
pn(x, ylx I ~y l , . . . ,xn .vyn_t )  ~ Pn(Y[Xl 'Yt ..... Xn_t,Yn.1 ,x n ) 
iI'=i=l( X~ x YO 
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and of two deterministic orrespondences (these are particular cases of the 
random correspondences, too); 
,,~ : 1~I (&  x Y3 ~ R+, 
4=1 
where 
Remark  3. 
(k = 1, 2), 
x ,  = x ,  g, = Y, (t = 1, 2,.., n). 
An abstract random automaton (Onicescu and Guia~u [6], 
Guia~u [2]), and a learning system (Guia~u [3]) are random categories too. 
From this point of view there are some connections between the random 
automata, the learning systems and the two-person games. 
3. THE RANDOM STRATEGY SUPPLYING THE LARGEST AMOUNT 
OF INFORMATION COMPATIBLE WITH THE UTILITIES 
OF ALL VARIANTS OF THE GAME 
For the player it is necessary to know the amount of information contained 
in all possible variants of the game and when these variants have some 
utilities in respect o a goal. I f  we have a game J in the sense of the Definition 
1, every possible variant of the game, namely every successive actions of the 
players xl,  Ya ..... x,~, y~ has the utility u~(x 1 , Y l  ..... x~,  y~) for the player 
k, (k = 1, 2). Every player wants to know if his random strategy supplies 
both the largest possible mean utility for him and the maximum uncertainty 
for his adversary. Of course, to solve this mixing problem, it is necessary to 
have a measure of information that takes into account both aspects of the 
information occurring in the theory of games, namely, the quantitative one, 
related to the probabilities of the game s variants, and the qualitative one, 
related to the utilities of the same game s variants. M. Beli~ and S. Guia~u [1], 
taking into account he two basic concepts of probability and utility, proposed 
such an information formula. We give its definition here. 
Let oJ~ ,..., ~on be a finite number of events and let p~ ,..., p.~ be the prob- 
abilities of occurence of these events satisfying 
P4~>0, ~P4= 1. 
4=1 
We suppose that the different events 0) 1 ,..., ~o n are more or less relevant 
depending upon the goal to be reached, that is, they have different utilities. Let 
ul ,..., un be the utilities of the events ~o 1 ,..., o)~, i.e., nonnegative real 
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numbers. The amount of information supplied by an experiment having 
the events 0) 1 , . . . ,  COn is  
I = I (u l , . . .  , un ,  P l , . . . ,  Pn) = -- ~ u ip i  log P i .  (6) 
i=l 
(An axiomatical treatment of this last formula was given together with a 
discussion in [1].) Of course, the utility of an event is independent of its 
objective probability of occurence, for instance, an event of small probability 
can have a great utility while an event of large probability can have a utility 
equal to zero with regard to a given goal. 
Let now J be a two-person game in the sense of the Definition 1, and let us 
consider the set of all possible variants of the game, i.e., the set 
{(x~, Yl ,--., Xn,  Yn)[ x i  @ X ,  Y i  @ Y ,  ( i  : 1, 2,..., n)}. 
Every variant of the game, i.e., every succession of actions x 1 , Y l  ,..., x,~, yn ,  
has the utility u~(x 1 ,Y l  ..... x,~ ,y,~) with respect to a goal, for the player 
k, (k = 1, 2). Then, if we know the probabilities of all possible variants of 
the game, i.e., the numbers 
P(n)(xl ,  Y l  , '",  Xn, Yn) >/O,  ~ P(n)(xl ,  Y l  , '", xn ,  Yn) = 1, 
xl ~X , ... ,xn ~X 
ylEY, . . .  ,yn~Y 
using expression (6), the amount of information of the game J for the player 
k, (k ----- 1, 2) will be 
Ik ( J )  = - -  ~ uk(xl , y~ ,..., x,, , y,~) p(~)(x~ , y~ ,..., x~ , Y,d 
Xl ~X , . .. ,xn~X 
y leY , . . . , yneY  
× logp(~)(xl, Yl ,..., x~, y~). (7) 
Let us suppose that the game J is a two-person game with independent 
strategies. Then, according to Definition 4, the random strategy of each 
player does not depend of the actions of the other one, and the probability 
of the variant of the game composed of the successive actions x I , Yl ,..., xn ,  Yn 
will be 
p(n)(x~ , y l  ,..., x~ , y~) = P(x~ ..... x~) Q( y~ ,..., yn), (8) 
where, of course, we have 
P(x l  ,..., Xn) >~ O, ~,, P (x  1 ,..., x,+) = 1, 
XlEX ~ . .  • ,xnEg 
(9) 
QCy, ,..., y,+) > o, ~ QCy, ,..., y,d = 1. 
y l~Y, . . . ,yneY 
112 GUIA~U 
For instance, if the probabilities (1) are given by the equalities (5), then the 
corresponding ame is a game with independent strategies, and according 
to Lemma 1 we have in this case 
P(x~ ,..., x,,) = p~(x~) [ I  pi(x, [ x~ ,..., x,_z) ,
i=2 
n 
Q(yz ,..., y,,) = 1-[ P:(Y~ [ yl ,..., y~-l). 
j= l  
Of course, the numbers P(x 1 ,..., xn) for xi ~ X, (i = 1, 2,..., n), represent 
a random strategy of the first player and the numbers Q(Yz ..... y~) for 
Yi e Y, (i = 1, 2 ..... n), represent a random strategy of the second player. 
According to (7) and (8) it follows that the amount of information of the game 
J with independent s rategies, for the player k, (k = 1, 2), is 
I~(J) = - ~ uk(&, yl ,..., x , ,  y~) P(xl ,..., x,,) Q(yi ,..., y,)  
x I  ~X , . . . ,xn ~X 
y leY , . . . , yneY  
× log P(xl,..., x,) Q(yl ,..., y,). ( lo )  
In the classical theory of games the random strategies maximizing the 
expectation of the utility, i.e., the mean utility, are investigated, where the 
expectation of the utility is 
Uk(Xl ,  yn) P(xl x,~) Q(yl y~). L y l  ,..., ,..., ,..., 
Xl~, . . . ,Xn~ 
y-j eY , . . .  , ynEY  
In the following, we shall investigate the existence and the effective form 
of the random strategy of the player k, (k = 1, 2), maximizing the expression 
(10) when the utilities ue(xl, Yl ..... xn, Yn) are given. 
We begin by simplifying the mathematical formalism. Indeed, if 
r : (card X) n, s ---- (card Y)', 
we denote 
R = l(~l, . . . ,~)] '~ >/O, ( i=  l,2,... ,r); ~ ' ,=  l I, 
i= l  
S = (~h ,..., r/,) [ ~j ~ O, ( j  = 1 ,2 , . , s ) ;  ~ r/a = 1 . 
~=1 
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Because we have (9), it results that 
(P(x 1 ..... x,)] x 1E X, .... x, ~ X} ~ R, 
{Q( yl ,..-, y-)[ yl ~ Y,..-, y~ 6 Y} ~ S. 
With these notations, if the first player adopts the random strategy 
=(~1 .... ,~ . )eR ,  
and if the Second player adopts the random strategy 
= (hi , . . . ,  n3  e S, 
then, according to the expression (10), the amount of information contained 
in the game J, for the player k, (k = 1, 2), is 
= - -  uij ~i'lJ log(~i~), 
i= l  j= l  
(11) 
where u~ ) represents he utility, for the player k of the variant of the game 
composed of the deterministic strategy i of the first player and of the second 
player's deterministic strategy j. 
It is necessary to notice here that expression (11) is expression (10), only 
the notations are different. 
Now, the problem is to determine the first player's random strategy that 
will maximize xpression (11) when the utilities u~ ) are given and when this 
first player does not know anything about the second player's behaviour. 
The second player's random strategy is determined in like fashion. 
Here, we present and prove the following lemmas" 
LEMMA 2. Let PI ,...,P,~ be a complete system of probabilities, i.e., 
Pi >~ 0, ~ Pi = 1, (12) 
i=1 
and let u 1 ,..., u~ be some utilities, i.e., nonnegative real numbers u i >~ 0,  
(i = 1, 2,..., n). The amount of information 
I = I (u l  ,..., u , , ,  P l  ,..., P,~) = - -  ~ ui Pi log Pi 
i=1 
(13) 
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is maximum if, and only if, we have 
Pi = exp - -  -~ /  , (i = 1, 2,..., n), 
where ~ satisfies the equality 
exp - -  = 1. 
i=1  ~- /  
The solution ~ of this last equation is just the maximum value of the information L
Proof. It is necessary to find the system of probabilities Pl . . . . .  Pn giving 
the maximum of the expression (13) compatible with condition (12) and with 
the utilities u 1 .... , u~. Obviously, we have 
log x < x - -  1 for every x :;& 1 
and 
log x ---- x - -  1 
if, and only if, x = 1. By using the classical Lagrange's multipliers method, 
we obtain 
g~ i~=1 p
I -- ~ = ui Pi lo - -  c~ 
i=1 "= 
= ~ pi(ui log Pi i~=lPi log 1 exp(--a))  
i=1  "= 
1 
exp(--a) - -  1). 
i=1  
/ 
The equality holds if, and only if, 
Pi = exp - -  , (i = 1, 2,..., n), (14) 
and then 
I ~ ~° 
Of course, the probabilities (14) must verify the condition (12), i.e., 
i=lexp - -~  = 1. 
Now, we prove the following simple lemma. 
Q.E.D. 
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LEMMA 3. Let 
f (~ ,ut , . . . ,un)  = ~ exp( -c~ 1 ) 
i= l  ~/  
be a function defined for all positive values of the variables ~, u t ,..., un . Then if 
and if  
we have 
Proof. We suppose 
This supposition implies 
and then 
tt  
f (~' ,  ul',..., u,') = f(~",  U 1 , . , , ,  Un)  = 1 
t l  t tt ! 
Ul  ~,,.~ U n 
tt ! 
tt 51. 
It results that 
vv t! ! t 
1 = f(~", u t ,..., u)  < f (a ' ,  u 1 ,..., u, ) = 1, 
and we obtained a contradiction. Then we have 
~" ~< ~'. Q.E.D. 
Let us return to the two-person game J with independent s rategies and 
to the expression (11). We prove the following main theorem about the 
maximum information compatible with his own utilities of the first player. 
THEOREM I. The first player can obtain a maximum information I1(~), 
depending on the random strategy ~1 of the second player, contained in the 
interval 
_~ ~< t,(,~) ~< a +/~, 05) 
(i = 1, 2,..., n). exp( ) exp 
i 
0~ tt 0£ r
- -  ( i  1, 2, . . . ,  n), 
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where ~_, &, and fi, respectively, are the solutions of the equations 
Proof. Let 
~exp( - -  ~;~ ~ u(1),, ~)=1 
i=1 1.t~.~1~/--q=l it "lJ 
(i> -) = 1, 
i=i max, ~j=i ucj ~7i 
maxe Z~.  u!~)~i ") = 1. 
~: = (6  ,..., ¢~), n = (7~ ,..., n3  
be two random strategies of the first and second players, respectively. 
According to expression (11), the amount of information contained in the 
game for the first player is 
-- ~ t~ U(1),~.~ ~ (~1 u(1)'~.~ - -  - -  ~1  ij ' -! ¢i log ¢i - -  i~ ~1 ~7," log ~.  
/=i "= i=i = 
If the behaviour of the second player are opposite to the interests of the 
first one, then the second player will choose his random strategy 7 so that 
the information I1(~, 7) be minimum. But 
1 min I1(~, 7) >/ ~ (rn~n ~ u~)7j)~:i log -~-i" 
i=l j~l 
On the other hand, the first player will choose his random strategy ~: so 
that the amount of information min, I1(~, 7) be maximum. Thus, the first 
player can obtain an amount of information satisfying the following inequality 
_~ ~< max min I1(~ , 7), (16) 
n 
where, according to the Lemma 2, _~ satisfies the equation 
~exp ( 
i=l 
) 1. min .v  u(1)~. 
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The maximum ~ is realized by the random strategy 
( ~ ) ~:i = exp -- min, X~=i u~'~/~- ' (i = 1, 2,..., r). 
If the second player has the same behaviour as the first one, then he will 
choose the random strategy ~ so that I1(~, 7) be maximum. But 
maxll(~,W) ~ ~ (max ~] um~] ~, log 1 ~=~ j=l " '''/ ~ + ~(~)' 
where fl(~) satisfies the equality 
exp ( ~(~) x->-- .O~/ = 1, 
j=l  / ' i=1  ij ~i 
and the first player will choose his random strategy ¢ so that the amount of 
information 
max I1(~ , ~/) 
will be maximum, too. We have, according to Lemma 2, 
max max I1(~, V) ~< & + max fl(~), (17) 
n 
where & satisfies the equation 
i exp (-- & 1. (1) "I i=~ max~ j=l uij ~ 
But from the Lemma 3, we have 
m~x 3(~) ~</~, (lS) 
where fl satisfies the equality 
z oxp ( -  ,1, ) = 1. j=l maxe ~i=1 uij ~:~ 
Finally, if the second player adopts an arbitrary random strategy 
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~7 = (~h ..... %), then the first player can obtain the maximum amount of 
information 
11(7) = max/1( G 7) 
j=l i=1 ~J 
where, according to the Lemma 3, 
~(~) ~< ~. (20) 
From the Lemma 2 we have 
0 ~< i (max ~1 u~'~i) , ,  log ~]~, (21) 
j=l 
and, obviously, Lemma 3, we have 
_~ < Ii(r/). (22) 
Then, from (16)-(22), we obtain just (15). Q.E.D. 
Remark 4. Clearly, we may formulate a similar theorem about the 
maximum information of the second player, I~(~), depending of the random 
strategy ~ of the first one. 
We prove now the following theorem: 
THEOREM 2. Let J be a two-person game with independent strategies o 
that the number of all possible deterministic strategies i the same for both players 
and equal to s. I f  the behaviours of the players are opposite and if  we have 
u m = u (2) (i, k = 1, 2 . , .  s). 
i k  k i  ' 
then 
max min I1(~:, F) = max min I2(~: , 7). 
Proof. We have, obviously 
max min I iG 7) = max min i i ,,(1,e ~ log 1 e n ¢ ' i=1 k=a ~ik si,tk ~i~/~ 
.Z s 1 
= maxe min, j i=1 )"~ k=l )'~ U(2)~ gk i  qksi log ~k~i 
= max rain Iz(~: , ~). v 
= max min f2(~1, $) 
Q.E.D. 
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Finally, let J be an arbitrary two-person game and we return to the 
notations from the Definition 1. If the first player knows the probabilities of 
the second player's actions, i.e., the probabilities 
P~(Y ] xl ,  Yl ..... xj-1, YJ-1, x~), ( j  = l, 2,..., n), 
then, from Lemmas 1 and 2 and from the relations (7) and (3) it results that 
the probabilities of his actions which maximize the amount of information 
compatible with the utilities 
u~(x l ,y l  .... , xn ,  Yn), xi ~ X ,  Yi  ~ Y,  (i = l, 2,..., n), 
must satisfy the equality 
n 
pl(Xl) YI p i (x i  ] Xl ' Y l  , ' " ,  X i -1 ,  Y/-1) 
i=2 
l-Ij= lp j (  I Xl Ul(Xl , Yl  , ' " ,  °%,, Yn ' , Y l  ,..., x j _ l ,  Y J -1,  xj) exp 
such that 
xkeX,  yT~Y,  (k= 1,2 ..... n), 
where a is the solution of the equation 
z ( ))=1 exp ul(xl  , Y l  ,..., xn , y,~ 
x l  ~X , . . .  ,Xn  ~ 
y~eY,... ,ynEY 
For the whole theory presented above it is very useful to give an example 
which shows the advantage to use the mixed measure of utility times 
information 
i=1  j= l  
instead of the usual expected utility 
Uk(~:, ~7)= ~ ~ u i~e i~,  (k = 1, 2). 
i=l j=l 
According to the notations given in this last paragraph, let us consider the 
following two particular cases: 
643/x612-2 
1'20 GuI~u 
A. Let there be a two-person game with the random strategies 
~to=l ,  ( l~<io~<r) ;  ~=0,  ( i : l , . . . ,r; i~:io), 
for the first player and 
7;0" ~jo- = ½, (1 -< . . . . . . . .  = --~30 <30 ~< s); ~ = 0, ( j  = 1,..., s;j =/=Jo ,J =/=Jo), 
for the second one. We suppose that the first player's utilities of the different 
t _-- 10, (i : 1,..., r; j : 1 ..... s). I f  the number variants of the game are uia 
~f all possible deterministic strategies of the first player is r = 21°, then for 
him the mean utility of the game is U 1 : 10 and the information of the same 
game compatible with his own utilities is I 1 : 10 • log 2 = 10. 
B. Now let there be another game for which 
¢~ = 2 -1°, (i = 1,..., 21°); 
~So' =~J0" = ½, (1 -< . . . .  -~Jo <3o ~< s), 
"H 
Wj =0,  ( j=  1,..., s;j •Jo',J +Jo), 
• ! .x 
(3o ,3o are the same as in the game A). 
I f  in this game uijl = 10, (i = 1 ..... 21°; j = 1 ..... s) then fo r  the first 
player, the mean utility is also U1 = 10, but the information compatible 
with his own utilities given above is ,i 
I ~'~ 210 210 1 
;[1 = -10L~ 1'= ~:~TJo' log(~:i~7~0')+ i=z2 ~7/j; log(~:,~30 ) = 10-log 211 = 110. 
Now the remaining problem is the following onO: Why is it better for 
player one to have an expected utility of 10, attained by having 21° equi- 
1 = 10 (i.e., the probable outcomes each of which gives the same utility u~j 
case B), rather than choosing a strategy such that only one outcome is 
possible, and it has a utility of 10 (i.e., the case A) ? Of course, it is true that 
in case B, player two is much less certain of the labelling of the particular 
choice which player one will make. But if all choices lead to the same result 
in terms of utility why should that uncertainty have any virtue for player one ? 
Of course, for the first player both in the first case as in the second one, 
the mean utility is the same and has the value I0 but, on the other hand, the 
This problem was proposed by the reviewer of the present paper. 
INFORMATIONAL MODEL FOR TWO-PERSON GAMES 121 
second playeri as a direct consequence of the uncertainty introduced by the 
actions of the first player in the case B, is unable to realize the desired mean 
utility. For instance, if the utilities of the different variants of the game 
for the second player are 
u2 u 2. -- : 10; 
ioJo' = ~o~o 
ui~2 = O, (i = 1,..., 2/°; i @ i o ,'j = 1,..., s); 
u2. . :0 ,  ( j= l,...,s;j @jo';j ~:jo), 
then the mean uti l i ty of the  player two is 
in case A and  
U~ u~0j0,~,0~0, + = 10"2 -1° = ~o~o~:~'o~J; 
in case B .  
Consequent ly ,  a l though fo r  the first player the mean uti l ity of the game is 
the same both  in case A as in case B, this  last case is less favorable for the 
second player as a direct consequence of the  uncerta inty  induced by the  
actions of player one and, of course, the s ituat ion descr ibed in case B is more  
preferable for player one. 
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According to one of his comments, if we have a two-person game J, with the utilitie~ 
uk(xl, Yl ..... x . ,  y~), xl ~ X, y~ e Y, (i = 1, 2..., n; k = 1, 2), (23} 
it is possible to define a new game J* with the new utilities 
uk(xl, Yl ..... xn, y.) log p(~)(xl, Yl ,..., x . ,  y.), 
(24} 
x ,~X,y~Y, ( i=  1,2 ..... n;k  = 1,2), 
and, consequently, the amount of information (7) for the game J with utilities (23} 
are just the usual expectation of the utilities (24) for the game J*. But, of course~ 
it is difficult to apply the classical results to the game J* because its utilities (24} 
depend on the probabilities with which strategies are chosen. 
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Note added in proof. I f  we know the random distribution p(x) on the set X and 
a random correspondence p(y Ix) between X and Y, then the following random 
correspondence p(x', y 1 x) between X and X × Y, given by 
p(x', y l x) = IPo0 (y l x) if 
Xt  ~ X~ 
if x' v ~ x, 
is very well defined. We denoted shortly this last random correspondence by
X ~(vl~) ~X × Y. 
This notation was used in the figures 1 and 3. 
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